280
to assume
the North of England at the time of "the Salford septaion" Military charge of the disturbed districts, when, after taking all reasonable precautions, my most difficult task was to allay unnecessary alarm on the part of the uninitiated at divers places, Manchester and other large towns.
13. If the Admiral possessed limited Experience, I can hardly believe we should have heard from him, in para. 2 of his letter to the Governor, Straits Settlements, such an account of how Fort Siloso might be totally destroyed by a few foreign officers visiting the place.
14. Even if such proceedings by foreign officers, by a civilized Government in time of peace, (they would of course be impossible in time of war, or even on war threatening) the mischief done, in comparison with personal risk encountered, would be so little and so soon repairable, that the attempt to injure fortifications, especially unfinished ones, in the way described has never, to my knowledge, been attempted. I have spoken to the agent and Manager of Nobles Explosives Co., who quite ridicules the idea of much harm being done under the circumstances mentioned.
15. The Admiral's dictum contained in para. 3 of his letter last quoted, viz: "once the knowledge of inside of a fort becomes known, together with its strength and the weight and position of its guns, the fort becomes useless" would, I fear, if accepted, mean that Malta, Gibraltar, and all our other fortresses are useless. I should have thought their usefulness depended rather upon the real efficiency of the works, guns, and armament.
280
to assume
the North of England at the time of "the" Salford" septaion" Military charge of the disturbed. districts, when, after taking all masonable precautions,
my
most
difficult task was to allay unnecessary
the part of the uninitiated
alarm on
at diver bool, Manchester and other
large
towns.
13. If the Admiral possesed limitar Experience,
I can hardly believe we
on étre past
should have heard from him,
in para: 2 d his letter to the Governor, Straits Settlements, such an account of how Fort Siloso might be totally destroyed by a few fordign officers visiting the place. 14. Even if such procedurigs If Jorrign officers by civilized yournment's in time of place, (they would of course be impossible in time of war, or Even on war threatening) the mischief done, in comparison with personal
were counter anded
risk
Brinke
nok in currad, would be so little and so soon repairable, that the attempt to
injure fortifications in the -Especially unfinished
that I
am aware
Ones
way
described
has never,
'been attempted.
I have spoken to the agent and Manager of Nobles beplosives Co. who quite ridicules the idea of much harm boning done under être circumstances mentioned. 15". The Admiral's dictum contained
letter last quoted, ory:
para: 3 of
in
that when
21
t
#
"
inside
of the
once the knowledge of
of a fort becomes known, together with it's stringth and the weight and position of its guns
the valur
: becomes useless"
the fort
"would, I fear,
cs are
are useless.
if accepted, mean that Malta, Gibraltar, and all our other fortress co
I should have thought their usefulness depended rather upon the real efficimay of the works, guns.
and
д
amison Ction
on
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